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Introduction
In the late 1980s Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev made the headlines launching the concept 'Common European Home', a metaphor for a uniied pan-European space, in which West and East would cooperate while maintaining their diversity. What is the relevance of this concept for today's Russian foreign policy discourse? Which lessons can be drawn for contemporary pan-European relations? Since tensions culminated into the Ukraine crisis (Haukkala, 2015) , relations between Russia and the Euro-Atlantic community have found themselves in the deepest crisis since the end of the Soviet Union. The idea of a Common European Home, an architecture for pan-European security and cooperation based on a balance of interests and common values, seems further than ever. Yet, it makes sense to revisit the concept. Many ideas behind this vaguely deined term have continued to appear in later Russian foreign policy rhetoric. However, as will be argued in this article, the context has changed substantially and with it the meaning that is given to these ideas.
The article starts by revisiting Gorbachev's concept of Common European Home and situates it in his radical reform of Soviet foreign policy. After that, similarities and di erences are explored between this concept and Russia's European policy under Putin. The emphasis is on the change of foreign policy discourse and relies on a comparative analysis of the conceptualisation of Europe -and Russia's relative position to it -in various Foreign Policy Concepts of the Russian Federation.
Revisiting Gorbachev's 'Common European Home'

New Political Thinking
Gorbachev's reform policy in the second half of the 1980s was sustained by three different pillars. Two of them still resonate in most languages: glasnost and perestroyka. The irst refers to the Soviet leader's campaign to create openness and later on democratisation. The second refers to a policy of restructuring, irst hesitant economic reforms, later on drastic liberal reforms. The third pillar does not resonate as strongly, in lack of a simple Russian catchword, but was probably the most important of all: New Political Thinking. It was in the ield of foreign policy and international relations that the USSR underwent its most spectacular change, leading to a reversal of the Soviet foreign policy doctrine and a far reaching de-ideologisation. Within this broad framework Gorbachev used the concept of 'Common European Home', a symbolically powerful term -bordering on utopianrather than a detailed blueprint for a new pan-European order. Until Gorbachev's reforms, Soviet foreign policy had been framed in strong ideological terms. It was dominated by the 'two camp doctrine', dating back to the early Soviet years, regarding the world as "deinitely and irrevocably split into two camps: the camp of imperialism and the camp of socialism … [and the struggle between them] … constitutes the hub of present-day a airs, determines the whole substance of the present home and foreign policies of the leaders of the old and the new world" (Stalin quoted in Kubálková and Cruickshank, 2015) . This doctrine was a projection of the class struggle onto the international level. In the same way as the class struggle between proletariat and bourgeoisie was inevitable, the struggle between capitalism and socialism was unavoidable. Along the same pattern socialism would in the end be victorious. Later on, in particular during the détente, this view was nuanced to that of 'peaceful coexistence' between both camps.
Rather than overruling the idea of an inevitable struggle, it took it to a new level, that of competition in various domains, including ideological, economic and cultural.
The New Political Thinking of the second half of the 1980s constituted a radical break with this ideological approach. It was built on three assumptions about international relations. First, the world had become increasingly interdependent. Secondly, global problems forced all countries to cooperate. This cooperation had become a matter of survival, because of the threat of nuclear annihilation and common ecological threats. Thirdly, war between capitalist countries was no longer seen as inevitable. Capitalist economies could develop without militarisation and development could be reached through disarmament.
As a result, the Marxist-Leninist theory of imperialism needed to be adjusted.
On this basis Gorbachev developed a radically new view of international relations in which 'human values' and the survival of mankind had absolute priority. International cooperation (not just peaceful coexistence) was to replace the two camp vision. Finally, there was a need for a system of universal security. In terms of military doctrine this was translated into the principle of "reasonable su ciency" of military capabilities and "defensive defence" (Gorbachev, 1988) . Many of these ideas were developed in his speeches and writings, mainly his book Perestroyka (Gorbachev, 1987) . The rupture with the traditional ideological framing of foreign policy could hardly be bigger. With the change of emphasis from class to humanitarianism, there is no ield in which we witnessed a more "dramatic deleninisation" (Sakwa, 1990, p. 322) than in foreign policy. But the New Political Thinking went well beyond words and was translated into unseen diplomatic demarches, such as the far reaching unilateral disarmament the Soviet leader proposed in his speech at the United Nations in 1988 (Gorbachev, 1988) . Gorbachev also stressed the need to democratise international relations and the right of any state to make sovereign choices. The latter would lead to no less than the burial of the Brezhnev doctrine, which had served to justify military intervention in socialist countries where socialism was 'threatened'. Tongue-in-cheek the spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign A airs, Gerasimov, stated that the Brezhnev doctrine was replaced by the Sinatra doctrine: as in Frank Sinatra's song 'I did it my way' the socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe had the right to do it their own way (Kull, 1992, pp. 139-140) . This message was not misunderstood in countries like Poland, where the governments started round table talks with the opposition, or in Hungary, where the authorities dismantled the iron curtain. Both events set into motion the radical changes of 1989 and the eventual collapse of the communist regimes in the satellite states.
The European Common Home
It is within this context that Gorbachev's proposal for a Common European Home needs to be situated. The term is mostly associated with his address to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe in 1989 (Gorbachev 1989) , which was entirely devoted to this theme. Yet, he used the term earlier and even prior to becoming Secretary-General of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), in a speech in London in 1984 (Rey, 2004, p. 34) .
1 Over time the concept developed from an image and a metaphor to a proposal for a pan-European architecture. Yet, it never took the form of a detailed blueprint and "lacked substance" (Sakwa, 2014, p. 252) . Like New Political Thinking it relects the ambition to deideologise international politics (Kull, 1992) and is profoundly idealistic (Rey, 2004, p. 39) .
In Strasbourg Gorbachev stated:
… Europeans can meet the challenges of the coming century only by pooling their efforts. We are convinced that what they need is one Europe -peaceful and democratic, a Europe that maintains all its diversity and common humanistic ideas, a prosperous Europe that extends its hand to the rest of the world. A Europe that conidently advances into the future. It is in such a Europe that we visualise our own future. (Gorbachev, 1989) The commitment to Europe was in the irst place a pro-European stance, a conirmation of the Soviet Union as a European country. "The idea of a Common European Home as presented by Gorbachev may have lacked substance, but it relected the powerful aspiration of the Soviet leader for his country to join the European political mainstream as part of a shared civilisation and political community" (Sakwa, 2014, p. 252) . It was a plea for a united, peaceful, integrated European continent.
At the heart of the concept of Common European Home is "a restructuring of the international order existing in Europe that would put the European common values in the forefront and make it possible to replace the traditional balance of forces with a balance of interests" (Gorbachev, 1989) . It is a house with several rooms, representing heterogeneity.
Unity in diversity is key (Kull, 1992, pp. 146-147) . It represents a multipolar, pluralistic vision of Europe, without centre of power (Sakwa, 2014, p. 27) .
As stated, the Common European Home concept was all but a blueprint for the aspired pan-European order, but at some instances Gorbachev got into more detail. The house can be represented as consisting of four di erent levels (Rey, 2004 , on the basis of three speeches by Gorbachev). The Helsinki geopolitical order (including the recognition of borders) formed the foundations of the house. The irst level was based on collective security and maximal disarmament. In the longer term it provided for the disappearance of alliances, which was later reframed as their transformation "into political organizations that could actively contribute to the rapprochement" (Rey, 2004, p. 40) . The second level represented the peaceful resolution of conlicts, the third economic and trade cooperation and the fourth a European cultural community.
In his Strasbourg speech, Gorbachev used a somewhat di erent metaphor, calling security the foundation of a common European home and "all-round cooperation … its bearing frame" (Gorbachev, 1989) . He also suggested that the Common European
Home should be thought of "as a community rooted in law" (Gorbachev, 1989) . Further, he added ecological, humanitarian, cultural and economic dimensions. As to the latter he called for "the emergence of a vast economic space from the Atlantic to the Urals where Eastern and Western parts would be strongly interlocked" (Gorbachev, 1989) . The US and Canada were not part of the Common European Home, but were seen as "fully associated with the project" (Rey, 2004, p. 39) . The latter broke with the traditional Soviet ambition to decouple the US and Western Europe (Rey, 2004, p. 37) , which would have made the project an easy target for Western critique.
The political translation of Gorbachev's idea of a Common European Home has been rather weak, despite the fact that it evolved from an image for public diplomacy purposes to more speciic proposals to establish a pan-European political organisation and despite Home. On the basis of the Foreign Policy Concepts and other central documents it lists similarities and di erences. Self-evidently the selection is not exhaustive.
Constant ideas
In the Russian Foreign Policy Concept of 2008 -more than 8 years after Putin's ascent to power -it is stated: "Russia calls for building a truly uniied Europe without divisive lines through equal interaction between Russia, the European Union and the United States" (Foreign Policy Concept, 2008, p. 20) . The phrasing is very similar to that of Gorbachev. But also when we look at some speciics, there are more matches than one would expect. Four in particular need to be mentioned: multipolar Europe, indivisible security, pan-European free trade and a legal basis for intra-European relations.
Multipolar Europe
The idea of a multipolar European continent has been a constant factor in Russian postcommunist foreign policy. The idea that the Russian Federation would be one of the key players in a new Europe went hand in hand with the ambition to regain status after the crumbling of the Soviet Union. Richard Sakwa describes the Russian post-Cold War project as 'Greater Europe'. It is "a vision of a continental Europe, stretching from Lisbon to Vladivostok, that has multiple centres, including Brussels, Moscow and Ankara, but with a common purpose in overcoming the divisions that have traditionally plagued the continent" (Sakwa, 2014, p. 27 ). The similarities with Gorbachev's view of a European continent, united in diversity, consisting of di erent centres of power stand out. The Greater Europe view is diametrically opposed to the 'Wider Europe' project of the Euro-Atlantic community, seeking to reinforce and extend existing 'western' structures of political, security and economic cooperation. The latter project sees power as unipolar, symbolically concentrated in Brussels (where the headquarters of NATO and most EU institutions are based), from where concentric circles emanate over the continent. Initially Russia was willing to accept Euro-Atlantic leadership, in the early 1990s through an America irst policy, later in the same decade by prioritising the EU as its primary partner (Medium-term Strategy, 1989) .
Under Putin the ambition of a close partnership with the EU did not really disappear. recognise mutual interest, rather than based on a community of shared values. One could see this evolution as a di erent way of Russia to achieve status enhancement (Freire, 2011; Larson ad Shevchenko, 2014) . While throughout the 1990s it was aiming to regain great power status by trying to be an acceptable partner within a Euro-Atlantic Community of states, it changed towards a strategy of pursuing its interests more independently. This change of course is partly due to domestic changes in Russia, but to a bigger extent to the increasing frustration of not receiving the recognition as a great power and equal partner.
In his irst term as President
Security: indivisible and collective
When it comes to security, the standard in Russian post-communist foreign policy documents is and remains the need for an "equitable and indivisible system of panEuropean security" (Foreign Policy Concept, 2013, art. 62) . Also in his Munich speech of 2007 Putin referred to the 'universal, indivisible character of security' (Putin, 2007) .
This recurring thought in Russian foreign policy mirrors Gorbachev's New Political
Thinking. Yet, while in the context of Gorbachev, the point of departure was a bipolar international system, for Putin the concept clearly becomes a way of objecting to the unipolar system, dominated by the US.
The system preferred on these grounds is a pan-European collective security system (see for example Mid-term Strategy, 1999; Foreign Policy Concept, 2008; National Security Concept, 2015) . In the Mid-term strategy of 1999, Moscow still saw the OSCE as the platform for such a security system. Yet, soon after that Russia's love for the organisation cooled down and Moscow regularly accused it of applying double standards in favour of the West. Moreover, the OSCE represented a fairly weak collective security system, operating in the shadow of NATO as collective defence organisation. The OSCE's role as a basis for building a collective security system did not disappear from Russian discourse the core idea was identical to the later oft used call to establish a common economic space 'from Lisbon to Vladivostok'.
Yet progress in this ield has been extremely limited. The PCA, which entered into force in 1997, was agreed for a period of ten years. With the expiry date approaching Moscow and Brussels started negotiating a new, enhanced agreement to replace the PCA. They failed to make tangible progress towards a Free Trade Area and the PCA was therefore silently prolonged, as provided by the treaty.
However far o it may seem now, a pan-European free trade area could have helped to resolve the incompatibility of membership of the Eurasian Economic Union and a free trade deal with the EU. It was this incompatibility that forced countries like Ukraine and Armenia to make a choice between Russia and the EU -a choice which in the case of Kyiv contributed to polarisation and turmoil.
International Law
Gorbachev emphasised the importance of international law as a basis both for inter- . It goes without saying that the credibility of the Russian discourse on respect for universal legal principles got seriously damaged by the annexation of Crimea in 2014, despite Putin's attempt to invoke Kosovo as a legal precedent. Russia also referred to the right of self-determination of Crimea and the defence of the rights of the Russian minorities to justify its intervention legally. These ambiguities notwithstanding, respect for international law continues to be a linchpin in Russia's foreign policy discourse (Foreign Policy Concept, 2000 , 2008 , 2013 . Moscow has repeatedly called to base relations with the EU on a solid legal basis.
Di erences
Despite the striking similarities in terms of terminology, there are important di erences between the Gorbachev project of a Common European Home and the formulation of a post-communist European policy under Putin. Many aspects could be mentioned, such as the decreasing role of disarmament, 2 the ecological dimension or the disappearance of a value-based framing. Three fundamental di erences will be underlined. First, the new context of relations between Russia and the EU, which has changed the meaning and purpose of some metaphors. Secondly, the disappearance of the idea of a uniied European cultural community or civilisation. Finally, the Eurasian turn in Russian foreign policy, which has changed the importance of Europe in its foreign policy discourse. All these changes have to be understood in a context of gradually escalating tensions with the West, whereby a mutual logic of competition and distrust gained ground and undermined collaborative relations. 
New context, new meaning
Metaphors get a certain meaning in a given context. When Gorbachev spoke about a Common European Home, he did so with the ambition to bridge deep di erences in a bipolar system. It was a time of progressive reconciliation between the Soviet Union and the West and of exceptional optimism, in which Gorbachev spoke to a generally well willing Western audience. He framed the project as part of his bigger project of deideologising Russian foreign policy and international relations (Kull, 1992) . Today, and clearly since Putin's Munich speech of 2007 (Putin, 2007) , the context is substantially di erent. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the disastrous 1990s, Russia has been seeking to make a comeback, claiming great power status, but got increasingly frustrated over the lack of recognition thereof. The context was one of dwindling trust in relations with the Euro-Atlantic Community, rather than the sharp increase of trust we witnessed in the Gorbachev days. Relations became increasingly 2 The Foreign Policy Concept of 2016 states that 'the Russian Federation seeks to bring the conventional arms control regime in Europe in line with current realities ' (Foreign Policy Concept, 2016, art. 30) .
3 For an analysis of the reasons behind this escalating logic of competition, see Casier, 2016. determined by a negative "logic of competition" (Casier, 2016) , which eventually culminated in the confrontation over Ukraine (Haukkala, 2015) . The emphasis in Russian foreign policy discourse was on sovereignty: Russia was no longer prepared to follow the path the West prescribed, but had the right to follow its own path independently. Also domestically, the context changed signiicantly. Gorbachev's reformist approach was carried by a community of mezhdunarodniki (International Relations experts) (Rey, 2006) and foreign policy school of 'Westernizers' (Tsygankov, 2016, p. 5 ) pushing for substantial reforms. Putin, on the contrary, had to balance a coalition between Statists (to whom state capabilities, sovereignty and status are key) and Civilisationists (who see Russia as culturally distinct from the West), with the latter having become increasingly inluential during his current term .
At the same time the political system had turned increasingly repressive and less democratic.
As a result, the debate about pan-European cooperation got decoupled from issues of democracy and human rights -in sharp contrast to the Gorbachev days when both went hand in hand.
In sum, the current context is profoundly negative. Trust is at its deepest since the end of the Soviet Union. Russia and the West tend to read each other's behaviour in negative zerosum terms. There are few prospects to reverse the spiral of competition. This implies that many of the concepts which Gorbachev used as positive concepts, as platform for collaboration, have now often become defensive vestiges within a broader discourse of rejecting a
Western "dictate" and acting against "NATO-centric egotism" (Lavrov, 2016) .
European civilisation
A second substantial di erence has to do with the understanding of European civilisation and Russia's place within it. Gorbachev put a strong emphasis on a European cultural community and civilisation, transcending the continent's heterogeneity. Over time also the Russian Foreign Policy Concepts repeatedly refer to civilisations and Russia being an "integral and inseparable part of the European civilization" (example taken from Foreign Policy Concept, 2013, art. 56). But there is a certain ambiguity. At the same time an emphasis is put on inter-civilisational relations and the need to harmonise them. The emphasis is always on dialogue and avoiding dividing lines (Foreign Policy Concept, 2013, art. 14) . This ambiguity seems to suggest that Russia is situating itself both apart from and within a European civilisation: "Russia stands ready to play a constructive role in ensuring a civilizational compatibility of Europe" (Foreign Policy Concept, 2008, p. 20). 4 Overall, Russia's relation in or to a European civilisation has taken a more antagonistic turn in recent years, when Russia and Western Europe got presented as competing civilisations. Tsygankov detects "a revival of civilizational thinking" in Russia, where the idea that Russia forms a distinct civilisation gained ground (Tsygankov, 2016, p. 150) . As of 2012
Putin started advancing the idea of 'state-civilization', in which ethnic Russians form the central and binding force of Russia as civilisation and state, while at the same time recognising the diversity of Russia and rejecting the idea of a mono-ethnic state (Tsygankov, 2016, p. 151 
Europe irst?
The third substantial di erence has to do with the importance of Europe in foreign pol- 5 It should be noted that the renewed confrontation between Russia and the West di ers fundamentally from the Cold War in that bipolarity and power symmetry have given way for a much more complex international system and a major power gap between the Euro-Atlantic Community and Russia. 6 This thought was repeated in di erent forms in respective Foreign Policy Concepts, where the Eurasian Economic Union was presented as an "e ective link between Europe and the Asia-Paciic region" (Foreign Policy Concept 2013, art. 44) or the priority was mentioned of "harmonizing and aligning interests of European and Eurasian integration processes" (Foreign Policy Concept 2016, art. 63) .
In this formulation there is no contradiction with Gorbachev's and later o cial Russian views on Greater Europe, multipolarity, interregional cooperation, a European-wide free trade area. Nor does Putin backtrack on the importance of the EU as primordial partner.
Yet, this changed as mutual suspicion of the EU and Russia over each other's integration projects increased. With the incompatibility of EU and Russian integration projects arising (see above) the tone shifted and Eurasian integration got presented as an alternative to cooperation with the EU, no longer a bridge. Fuelled by the Ukraine crisis the emphasis was put even more strongly on Eurasian cooperation and rivalling integration projects: the West was accused of "countering integration processes and creating seats of tension in the Eurasian region" (National Security Strategy, 2015, art. 17) .
With the increasing use of references to Eurasian, the Euro-Atlantic space stopped being the key point of reference in Russian foreign policy, as it was under Medvedev's presidency. Yet, this as well is fraught with ambiguity. Eurasian economic integration itself is to a large extent modelled after the EU and thus represents a neoliberal template (Morozov, 2018, p. 35) . Yet, at the same time the term Eurasian can have geopolitical or civilizational connotations. It is a di cult term to use as it represents many strands, generations and degrees of radicalism. Yet, with an increasing emphasis on Eurasian as a qualiier, the question can be raised whether Eurasianism is still the "metaphorical dog that did not bark" which Natalia Morozova claimed it to be under Putin at the time of writing (Morozova, 2009, p. 683) .
Conclusion
Even though Gorbachev's concept of Common European Home was short-lived, many of its central ideas survived the Soviet Union and continued to inluence Russian foreign policy rhetoric for many years. Ideas of a multipolar Europe with pan-European indivisible collective security, rooted in law and with a free trade area from Lisbon to Vladivostok continued to be hallmarks of Russia's European policy discourse until fairly recently. But some major changes also occurred. Not least the context. With views of the post-Cold War European security order at loggerheads, relations came to be dominated by a logic of competition and distrust, in contrast to the cooperative atmosphere of the late Gorbachev years. In this context some words obtained substantially new meanings and often became an instrument for defence rather than cooperation. Secondly, the idea of a common European civilisation of which Russia was an essential part disappeared. The interpretation that a civilizational competition is taking place gained ground. The inluence of deeply conservative views that Russia represents the genuine values of Europe, which the West has betrayed, has grown strongly. Today Russia sets itself apart from (the rest of) Europe. Finally, Europe has lost its central role and the positive evaluation of the EU as primordial partner has faded away. Moscow announced its own pivot to Asia but also invested in its own Eurasian integration projects. While the
